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THE MEEK SHALL INHERIT THE EARTH:
A POWER-BASED THEORY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS ON RELIGION
JANE RUTHERFORD*
My mother used to tell me that it was easier to catch flies with honey
than with vinegar. The government long ago learned that lesson. It often tries
to influence behavior by offering benefits in exchange for the desired conduct.
Depending on the desired outcome, the Court variously describes these trans-
actions as penalties,' subsidies,2 or non-subsidies.3 The way we describe
these practices carries persuasive force,4 so more vividly we might call these
deals threats, bribes, or offers. Some dispute exists over whether the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine governs the allocation of benefits or burdens.'
However, benefits and burdens are merely different ways of describing the
same thing. Relieving a burden is a form of a benefit. Similarly, creating
benefits for one class necessarily creates burdens for others.
The practice becomes problematic when the government uses conditions
to divest constitutional rights. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds
that the government cannot make an individual choose between getting a state
conferred benefit and giving up a constitutional right. For example, individuals
qualified for unemployment compensation may not be forced to choose be-
tween unemployment benefits and the free exercise of their religion.6
* Associate Professor of Law at DePaul University College of Law. A.B., University of
Chicago, 1972; J.D., University of Michigan, 1975. I am grateful to Timothy O'Neill, Pamela
Karlan, and Martha Minow for their invaluable comments. I am also grateful for the research
assistance of Shery Buske, Vanessa Greenwood, and Lucia Flores.
1. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (holding that prohibiting a min-
ister from elective office penalizes him for his religious vocation).
2. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (holding that state funded spe-
cial education teachers in parochial schools subsidized religion).
3. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the refusal to permit Med-
icaid funds to be used for medically necessary abortions did not place obstacles in a woman's path
to exercise her rights of free choice, but merely refused to subsidize such a choice); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that the state could encourage women to choose not to have elective
abortions by refusing to subsidize them).
4. For a discussion on the impact of the choice of such terms, see generally Peter Westen,
"Freedom" and "Coercion"-Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE LJ. 541.
5. This distinction drives the debate over the use of the doctrine in the Takings Clause. See
Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); see also Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. CL 2309, 2317 (1994).
6. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Re-
view Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). But see Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a state could condi-
tion unemployment benefits on complying with a criminal statute that prohibited peyote use even
in Native American religious ceremonies).
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Expressed in that form, the doctrine seems to focus on the issue of coer-
cion. It may be tempting to simplify the definition of coercion to limit it to
force that leaves the victim with no choice at all. Such a narrow definition of
coercion fails to account for the real world of constrained choices. Contrary to
the classic liberal view of individuals as purely autonomous actors, most indi-
viduals have circumscribed power to exercise autonomy. As Professor Kathryn
Abrams explains, individuals possess partial agency in which actors can exert
some control, but are subject to limiting pressures.' This notion of partial
coercion recognizes the individual actor's choices, but also accounts for soci-
etal pressure to choose.
Some choices are more constrained than others. For example, public hous-
ing residents who must choose between homelessness and waiving their Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches are more constrained
than government contractors who agree to plant inspections.8 Therefore, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions also recognizes the problem of undue
influence. Individuals can be pressured to relinquish constitutionally protected
freedoms with both penalties and benefits.
Some scholars like William Marshall and Cass Sunstein have suggested
that we don't really need to debate the nature of the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine.9 Marshall argues that the analysis collapses into a discussion of
the particular constitutional right impinged. For instance, the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions in the context of religion boils down to whether the
government has violated either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment
Clause. That view is bolstered by the Supreme Court's decision in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia"° which over-
turned financial benefits conditioned on non-religious speech without mention-
ing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Although the final result in unconstitutional conditions cases ultimately
may turn on the constitutionality of the underlying conduct, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions highlights three distinct elements of the debate.
First, it establishes the rule that the government cannot achieve indirectly what
it is forbidden to do directly." Thus, it refutes the argument that the greater
7. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 353 (1995) (arguing for a theory of partial agency in which women are
seen as oppressed, but still capable of making limited choices).
8. For a discussion of unconstitutional conditions in the context of public housing, see
William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 553 (1992); Jason S. Thaler, Note, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional Con-
dition or Constitutional Necessity?, 63 FoRIIAM L. REV. 1777 (1995); Steven Yarosh, Comment,
Operation Clean Sweep: Is the Chicago Housing Authority "Sweeping" Away the Fourth Amend-
ment?, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1103 (1992).
9. See William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions:
The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Reli-
gion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).
10. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995)
11. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 619 (1918) ("The fact that the law does not
directly prohibit religious exercise but merely conditions eligibility for office on its abandonment
does not alter the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause."). But see South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that the federal government can indirectly regulate the
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power to dismantle the benefit program altogether includes the lesser power to
retract a benefit unless a constitutional right is relinquished. 2 Second, the
doctrine shifts the focus from individual entitlements to structural limits on
power.'3 Third, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions introduces the no-
tion that the government can intrude on a constitutional right without com-
pletely violating the right. Thus, it creates a sliding scale so that the more the
government infringes on the right, the more justification it needs. 4
When viewed through the lens of individual rights, unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine lends little to the basic constitutional analysis that would be
applied anyway. Once the Court has acknowledged that states cannot do indi-
rectly what they are prohibited from doing directly, the only issue that remains
is whether the burden on the constitutional right amounts to a violation, and
whether it is justified by the appropriate level of scrutiny.
From a more structural perspective, however, it matters a great deal. It is
precisely because the state has far more power in the regulatory welfare state
than anticipated at the time of the founding, that we must be more concerned
with use of that unforeseen power. Therefore, one eminent scholar has argued
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should focus on limiting power."
As Kathleen Sullivan suggests, when the government places conditions on
benefits, it affects various balances of power. First, by getting individuals to
relinquish their rights, unconstitutional conditions augment government power
over individuals in general. Second, such conditions may affect the balance of
power between individuals. Those who gain benefits may have a competitive
advantage over those who are denied benefits.' 6 Third, the allocation of bene-
fits may change how individuals relate to intermediate institutions like the
church. For example, granting religious institutions an exemption from em-
ployment discrimination laws gives religions more power to discriminate than
other employers and gives them more power over their employees. 7
drinking age by conditioning highway funding on compliance with an elevated age for drinking).
12. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is often described as the greatest proponent of this for-
malistic argument that the greater power to create a benefit or an institution includes the lesser
power to place conditions on it. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 597; Charles R. Bogle, Note,
"Unconscionable" Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Bene-
fits, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 193, 197 n.14 (1994). For a more complete discussion of the argument
that the greater includes the lesser, see generally Robert Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the
Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227. Compare Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) (endorsing the greater includes
the lesser argument to uphold a statute that prohibited advertizing of casinos) with Nollan v. Cal-
ifornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (rejecting the argument in a takings case).
13. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv.
1413 (1989).
14. See, e.g, Epstein, supra note 5 (arguing that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
most imperative when the risk of serious abuse is greatest).
15. See generally Sullivan, supra note 13.
16. For example, merchants whose religious practices coincide with Sunday closing laws are
permitted to keep their businesses open six days a week and still comply with their sabbath re-
quirements. These merchants get a competitive advantage over Jewish merchants who cannot open
their stores on Saturday because of religious restrictions and are prohibited from opening their
stores on Sundays because of Sunday closing laws. This argument was rejected in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
17. See Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483
1995]
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My thesis is that whether a governmentally imposed condition is constitu-
tional depends on the relative power of the individuals or groups affected by
the condition. Because the greatest risks arise from the largest power dispari-
ties, the more a condition entrenches or expands power disparities, the more
likely it is to be unconstitutional. 8 Such a sliding scale for unconstitutional
conditions helps avoid the formal and arguably false dichotomy between strict
scrutiny and the rational basis test. Because the sliding scale is based on some
measurement of relative power, we need to define power.
Power means "possession of control, authority, or influence over oth-
ers."' 9 This definition includes two different kinds of power: (1) power
"over" people or things, a source of control or dominance; and (2) power "to"
do things, a source of energy or cooperative strength. 2' The famous sociolo-
gist Max Weber defined power solely in terms of hierarchial force.2' Political
scientist Robert Dahl defined power a little more broadly to include the possi-
bility of influence as well as control. 22 Coercive power "over" others is nec-
U.S. 327 (1987). In Amos, the church had fired a custodian who worked at a gymnasium because
he was not a Mormon. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Title VII exception that per-
mits churches to discriminate on the basis of religion. The Court failed to focus on how that deci-
sion would affect individuals meant to be protected by Title VII. In a state like Utah, where the
church controls many of the available jobs, permitting such discrimination may seriously limit the
job prospects of non-Mormons. The Court never even considered whether the exception violated
the Equal Protection Clause. As a result, the Court lends state power to encourage individuals to
join the Mormon Church.
Although Amos is a troubling case, it does not raise the specter of dual discrimination. The
custodian only complained of religious discrimination. In contrast, some employment discrimina-
tion claimants complain of age, disability, sex, or race discrimination. See, e.g., Young v. Northern
Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 3201
(1994) (race and sex discrimination); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929
F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (age and sex discrimination). It is more reasonable to accommodate
religion by permitting it to prefer members of its own denomination, than to permit it to discrimi-
nate against members of its own denomination on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability.
18. For a similar argument, see Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV.
1 (1992) (arguing that government actions that entrench or expand power disparities violate due
process, while those that improve the balance of power provide due process).
19. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 922 (1984). For a similar comparative
definition of power, see Rutherford, supra note 18, at 78.
20. For discussions of the difference between the power "to" and power "over," see MARI-
LYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: ON WOMEN, MEN, AND MORALs 505 (1985); STEVEN LuKES,
POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 28-31 (1974); Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Femi-
nist Deconstruction, 33 B.C. L. REV. 481, 491 (1992) [hereinafter Crain, Images]; Marion Crain,
Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819, 1874 (1991); Angela P. Harris, The Juris-
prudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741, 773 (1994); Lynne Henderson, Getting to
Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 53 n.66 (1993); Linda
K. Kerber, A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like... Ladies: Women, Civic Obligation, and
Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 107 n.37 (1993); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, I Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 28 (1993);
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48 (1988).
21. "In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or a number of men to real-
ize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in
the action." 2 MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 926 (1968).
22. "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do." Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, in 2 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 201 (1957),
reprinted in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 79, 81 (Roderick Bell et
al. eds., 1969). For descriptions of the pluralist approach to political power, see Nelson W.
Polsby, How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative, 22 J. POL. 474 (1960), re-
printed in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra, at 123.
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essarily hierarchial. Powerful individuals have the capacity to compel obedi-
ence of those below them in the social order. The liberal tradition sees power
as hierarchical and therefore emphasizes individual rights as necessary to
secure liberty defined in terms of autonomy.
Power need not be rooted in compulsion, however. It may also arise from
the ability to persuade others to act in concert for a common goal." As the
famous scholar Hannah Arendt noted, power
corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert.
Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group
and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together.
When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to
his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their
name.
24
This cooperative power "to" accomplish things reflects a civic republican
tradition that finds freedom through participation in a community in which the
public good is more important than individual interests.' Both traditions are
embedded in American constitutional history.26
The power to dominate may also arise from control of scarce resources.
Those who control rare goods can extract concessions from those who need
the resources. Dominance power is inherently hierarchial. Some necessarily
have more power than others. In contrast, cooperative power need not be
hierarchial. The power arises from the shared efforts of a group. It is the rela-
tionship between members of the group that creates the power. Those who
exercise the most power "over" others sit at the top of a pyramid. Those who
exercise the most power "to" get cooperation sit in the middle of a web con-
23. See DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES AND USES 21 (1979).
24. HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 48 (1970), quoted in LUKES, supra note 20, at 28.
25. For a discussion of the difference between power "to" and power "over," see supra note
20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of civic republicanism, see Lynne Henderson, Author-
itarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379 (1991); Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liber-
ality in American Communal Life, 88 MiCH. L. REv. 983 (1990); Frank I. Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539 (1988).
26. The liberal tradition emerges from John Locke's political philosophy that conceives of
liberty as an individual right to life and property secured from others by government. JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698). This
philosophy influenced the federalists who wrote the original Constitution and viewed the docu-
ment as merely setting limits on government power. See Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION
IN AMERICA 9 (1955). In contrast, the civic republican tradition traces its roots to Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Aristotle who sought to define communal public virtue through participation in
government HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTi-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981). Republican
political theory influenced the anti-federalists who insisted that the original Constitution be amend-
ed with a bill of rights. See generally JOHN G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ES-
SAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY (1971). For a description of these two traditions, cast
as "negative" and "positive" rights, see IsAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). For
analyses of the civic republican viewpoint, see Hirshman, supra note 25; Michelman, supra note
25; Sunstein, supra note 25.
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nected to many others.27 Because many webs can be interconnected, many
different individuals may share power in complex ways.
Sometimes these various kinds of power can be exchanged. Thus, those
who have cooperative power may be able to organize well to generate funding.
Funding, a scarce resource, enables them to exercise hierarchical power as
well. Similarly, those with hierarchical power may be able to use their scarce
resources to purchase the cooperative skills of an organizer. Both hierarchical
power and cooperative power are themselves scarce resources.
Therefore, power is a relative term. The definition of "power" establishes
a comparison. Some have more power to either dominate or to persuade oth-
ers. For example, a religious institution might be fairly small and powerless
vis-A-vis the government, but quite powerful over an employee or a religious
adherent. Similarly, various individuals or groups hold differing amounts of fi-
nancial and political power in particular contexts. In evaluating a particular
bargain the government offers to an individual or group, we need to evaluate
the relative power of those involved-those who are offered the condition,
those who sought to create the condition, and the government itself. Generally,
however, the government wields the most power because of its access to tax
dollars to fund benefits programs and its regulatory authority to control the
behavior of both individuals and institutions.
Religions also may be very powerful. They can offer both moral authority
and a committed block of voters to augment the power of government. The
government has enormous hierarchical power backed by resources of tax dol-
lars and law enforcement. Therefore, we should be concerned about the com-
bined power of church and state. When religion and government act in concert
either to benefit religion or to disadvantage a competitor, they jointly wield
considerable power.
Indeed, we favor religious pluralism to avoid the combined power of
church and state. That principle acknowledges the power of the church as well
as the power of the state. Because both governments and religions can be
powerful, we need both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses. The
Establishment Clause helps avoid the combined power of church and state,2"
while the Free Exercise Clause limits the power of the church by dividing that
power into many sources,29 and assuring individuals the right to follow their
consciences.
Literally, the Establishment Clause directs that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion . .,3 The founders feared an es-
27. Crain, Images, supra note 20, at 511. For a fuller development of these contrasting
views, see CAROL GILUGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
28. William P. Marshall, The Inequality of Anti-Establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 68-
71.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Cf Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766,
774-75 (D. Ariz. 1963) ("[L]ack of violation of the 'establishment clause' does not ipso facto
preclude violation of the 'free exercise clause.' For the former looks to the majority's concept of
the term religion, the latter the minority's.").
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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tablished church for three reasons: (1) it would be corrupted by govern-
ment; a' (2) it would repress competing views;32 and (3) it would promote
sectarian violence.13 Madison's solution was to limit religious power by creat-
ing a structure designed to encourage a multitude of sects.3 ' Hence, Madison
favored religious liberty, in part, because it helped balance power.
Thomas Jefferson seemed to espouse Roger William's view that the
church could be corrupted by interacting with government, noting that individ-
uals could be "brib[ed] with a monopoly of worldly honours and emolu-
ments. ' ,3' However, he thought the problem was limited to an established
church like the Church of England. The framers did not foresee the
development of the modern welfare state in which the government is a major
source of goods and benefits. Consequently, few structural limits were placed
in the Constitution to restrict the abuse of such power outside the context of
an established church.
This combination of church and state power is particularly ominous when
it targets a disfavored group. For our purposes, a disfavored group is one that
shares immutable qualities, was historically discriminated against, and has
diminished political clout.3 6 Some currently disfavored groups include
minority religions, Native Americans, racial groups, women, the disabled, and
the aged. When the combined power of church and state is amassed against a
disfavored group, the conditions imposed must be subject to the strictest
scrutiny. For example, the exemptions given to religious institutions for
employment discrimination are highly suspect.3
31. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
No. 7 (1785), in ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY 104 (1990) ("[E]cclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and
efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation."). Madison may have been influenced by
Roger Williams who argued that the separation of church and state is a means of protecting reli-
gion from the corruption of the government. See GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND
AMERCAN POLITICS 341-53 (1990); Marshall, supra note 28, at 68.
32. Hence, Thomas Jefferson opposed the Virginia bill to establish religious teachers in part
because it "assumed dominion over the faith of others... and ...destroys religious liberty."
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785), in ADAMS & EMMERICH,
supra note 31, at 110.
33. For example, Madison wrote: "Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by
vain attempts of the secular arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in
Religious opinion." James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
No. 11 (1785), in ADAMs & EMMERICH, supra note 31, at 108.
34. "A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but
the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against
any danger from that source." THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious
rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the
multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of
interests and sects.
Id. No. 51, at 324 (James Madison).
35. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785), in ADAMs &
EMMERICH, supra note 31, at 111.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
37. For discussions of the problem of religious institutions that discriminate in employment,
see Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of
Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514 (1979); Joanne C. Brant,
1995]
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The combined power of church and state also raises Establishment Clause
concerns even when those affected are not members of disfavored groups. For
instance, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,"
establishment problems arose because a state university forced students who
did not share the religious perspective of a Christian group to pay to publish
the avowedly Christian texts. Objecting students may not be part of any
disfavored minority, and because they are a diffuse population with no
common cohesive group, they may have had difficulty organizing. In this
sense, these students had relatively little cooperative power available compared
to the well-organized Christian group.
So far we have been looking at conditions that might offend the
Establishment Clause. Sometimes, free exercise concerns cause us to worry
about the exercise of government power as well. It is especially troubling
when those excluded from benefits on the basis of the religion clauses are also
members of other groups with a history of discrimination. For example, in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,39 the Court
held that Native Americans could be denied unemployment benefits when they
were fired for sacramental use of peyote. This case is troubling not only
because a government benefit was conditioned on the surrender of a free
exercise right, but also because the targeted religion was one well outside the
mainstream.
Indeed, Native Americans often lose religion clause cases.' Tribes may
be less powerful for several reasons. First, although individual tribes may
constitute cohesive groups with common goals, Native Americans have
different religious views and perspectives. Thus, the degree of cooperative
power is somewhat minimized. Moreover, Native Americans lack access to
some of the resources that would help them use their cooperative skills.
Because they are near the bottom of the economic scale, they have difficulty
fund-raising from their ranks. Hence, they lack the kind of hierarchial power
that some other faiths have acquired. Religions more familiar to the ruling
classes are more likely to be protected both because their religious views are
more easily recognized and because the religious adherents have more access
to hierarchial power.4
"Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discrimi-
nate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275 (1994); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of the Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions:
The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987); Jane Rutherford, Equality
as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Law to
Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming January 1996).
38. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
39. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
40. See, e.g., id. (permitting a state to interfere with Native American sacred ceremonies
involving peyote); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(permitting the federal government to build a road through territory sacred to Native Americans);
see also Kristen L. Boyles, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed Amendment to the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1117 (1991); Colloquy, The Native American
Struggle: Conquering the Rule of Law, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 199 (1993).
41. Kenneth L. Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections on Lukumi, 69
TUL. L. REv. 335, 359 (1994).
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By concentrating on individual free exercise questions, rather than the
larger issue of the balance of power between a marginalized faith and the
state, the Court missed one of the central purposes of the religion clauses: to
disperse power. Hence, Smith was decided on the wrong grounds. The Court
should have been concerned about whether the government was using its
superior power to place Native American religious adherents at a disadvantage.
Other individuals had been permitted to collect unemployment insurance
claims when they lost jobs because of compliance with religious duties.4'
Similarly, during prohibition, Christians and Jews were permitted sacramental
use of wine.43
Thus, the question in Smith should have been whether the law treated
substance abuse in Native American religions (sacramental peyote use)
differently than substance abuse in mainstream Christian religions (sacramental
alcohol consumption by minors)." Viewed as a targeting case, Smith would
have come out the other way. Under my power-based analysis, these cases
raise more concerns because Native Americans share inborn immutable traits,
are relatively powerless, and share a history of discrimination. By concentrat-
ing on the balance of power, we avoid the fruitless debate over the level of
scrutiny applied and recast the dialogue in more principled terms.
Most constitutional rights protect individuals. The dialogue on
unconstitutional conditions focuses on the deals government offers individuals.
As a result, the doctrine tends to concentrate on issues of coercion. However,
constitutional rights also have a communal element as well.45 They are
designed as part of a structure that limits government power for the common
good. For purposes of limiting power, whether a particular individual is
coerced may be less important than how the transaction affects the balance of
power.' When individuals relinquish their rights, the rights are asserted less
frequently, and the value of the rights in general diminishes for all of us.
The founders designed the Constitution to limit power by dividing it
among different power bases. Hence, they balanced state and national power
by creating a complex federal system,47 and divided national power among
the branches of government.' Similarly, the framers were concerned with
limiting government power over religion and religious power over government.
The First Amendment was designed to constrain the power of government to
limit religious freedom or to establish religion.49
42. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a Seventh Day Adventist could
not be denied unemployment benefits for refusing to be available to work on Saturdays).
43. Smith, 494 U.S. at 913 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. See Karst, supra note 41.
45. See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1990).
46. See Sullivan, supra note 13.
47. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1; THE
FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although this rule originally was meant to apply to federal
government, some of the framers already were engaged in opposing state establishments of
religion. For example, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson actively opposed a bill to use state
funds to hire religious teachers in Virginia. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 31. By the time that the
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The modem doctrine of unconstitutional conditions confines the power to
manipulate government benefits. When we think of unconstitutional conditions
in the context of religion, we tend to think of the unemployment compensation
cases, 50 or limits on government funding of religious enterprises." In these
cases, the government is allocating a benefit and conditioning it in ways that
may intrude on the free exercise of religion. Thus far, the analysis is much
like that of any other unconstitutional conditions case. In the case of religion,
however, the Establishment Clause may present a further constraint. If the
government refuses the benefit, it may intrude on free exercise, or discriminate
against religion. If the government provides the benefit, it may subsidize
religion and violate the Establishment Clause. Generally, the unconstitutional
conditions cases have ruled that the government is free to choose what to
subsidize, but that it cannot penalize a constitutional right. As the
welfare/regulatory state grows, the tension between the religion clauses
expands.52 The religion clauses are interesting because the tension between
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause seems to
constitutionalize the distinction between penalties and non-subsidies.
Under the Free Exercise Clause it may be unconstitutional to penalize
religious activity." Under the Establishment Clause, it may be
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted after the Civil War, virtually all states had disestablished any
state churches. In 1947, the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause was incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947). Hence, the strictures of the Establishment Clause now apply to both the state and federal
governments.
50. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
51. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
52. See Karst, supra note 41.
53. The Court's standard for free exercise violations has vacillated between deference to
religion and deference to state regulation. Hence, a few cases claim to apply strict scrutiny to
government rules or conditions that interfere with the free exercise of religion, requiring a
compelling state interest to justify the rules. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vetoer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(applying strict scrutiny to invalidate an unemployment statute). However, the compelling interest
test has never been as strict as that applied in the equal protection cases, nor has it been applied as
uniformly.
More recent cases have deferred to state regulations of religion, applying a "neutrality" test.
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993); Board of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). In these cases, the Court held that
government should act neutrally toward religion, creating general rules not designed to benefit or
burden particular faiths. Neutrality can be a troublesome concept. In one sense, no "neutral"
position exists. All laws necessarily either apply to or exempt religion. Hence, neutrality in that
sense is impossible. The Court defines neutral rules to be: (1) generally applicable, and (2) not
targeted at particular faiths. In Smith, the Court veered so far toward neutrality that it seemingly
overruled the compelling state interest test altogether. There, the Court ruled that Native American
free exercise rights could not protect believers from a "valid neutral law of general applicability"
that prohibited the use of peyote even for sacramental purposes. Few free exercise claims could
survive this test. In order to meet it, a claimant would have to demonstrate that the government
intended to target a given religion. Consequently, Smith swung the pendulum away from deference
to religious authority, back toward government neutrality to religion.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993),
restored the compelling state interest test. It remains unclear, however, how stringently the
compelling interest test will be applied. RFRA may merely reinstate the weak form of the test
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unconstitutional to subsidize religion. 4 Arguably, therefore, it is only
constitutional to impose a condition if it is neither a penalty nor a subsidy.
Because most conditions can be construed to be one or both, we would expect
almost all conditions that affect religions to be unconstitutional. In fact,
however, the cases are divided and apparently inconsistent."s The problem is
that we cannot coherently distinguish a penalty from a non-subsidy.56
Consequently, the cases seem in disarray.
The same conduct can be considered either a penalty, or a refusal to
subsidize. For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University
of Virginia,57 the issue was whether a state university must provide student
activity fees for a religious publication. The petitioner argued that providing
such fees to other publications that discuss the same issues from a secular
perspective, but denying them to a religious publication, amounts to a penalty
for a religious viewpoint. In contrast, the respondent argued that funding
student activities is a direct state subsidy that would violate the Establishment
Clause if provided to a religious group. Merely changing the formal label from
"penalty" to "subsidy" does not help decide which bargains offend the Consti-
tution.
Individuals denied a subsidy that everyone else receives are penalized.
The Free Exercise Clause suggests that the government should not be able to
use its power to exclude religious individuals from benefits available to all
others. Thus, Rosenberger is consistent with prior cases that prohibited
conditions that discriminated on the basis of religion. For example, in
McDaniel v. Paty,6 the Court held that a state could not exclude members of
the clergy from the opportunity to hold political office. Arguably, the plaintiff
was not precluded from running for office because he had a "choice" to be
either a candidate or a member of the clergy. The Court rejected the idea that
used by courts prior to Smith. The Supreme Court seems to continue to support the neutrality
principle of Smith and cites it approvingly in dicta in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye and more
openly in Grumet. Even under the neutrality principle of Smith, it still would be unconstitutional
to penalize a free exercise right under some circumstances.
54. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (special education teachers in
sectarian schools amount to a subsidy); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (buses for
fieldtrips are an unconstitutional subsidy); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (maps, charts,
and special education teachers supplied to parochial schools are unconstitutional subsidies). But
see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (student activity
fees for a religious magazine is not a subsidy); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(buses for transportation to sectarian schools are not an unconstitutional subsidy).
55. Compare School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (special education teachers in
sectarian schools amount to a subsidy) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (buses for
fieldtrips are an unconstitutional subsidy) and Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (maps,
charts, and special education teachers supplied to parochial schools is an unconstitutional subsidy)
with Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (permitting a sign language
interpreter in a parochial school) and Muller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (permitting tax
deductions for parochial school tuition) and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(permitting school buses to transport children to and from parochial schools).
56. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271
(1990); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); Sullivan, supra note 13.
57. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
58. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
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a government could condition political office on relinquishing the
constitutional right to freely exercise religion as a member of the clergy.
Although McDaniel v. Paty seems a particularly strong case both because the
right to hold office was constitutionally guaranteed, and because it did not
involve the payment of state funds, the Court has extended the reasoning of
McDaniel to other government financial benefits that are not constitutionally
mandated. For instance, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for
the Blind, 9 the Court held that a state program for the benefit of the blind
could not be denied to an individual studying to become a minister. Therefore,
it would seem that the government cannot condition a state benefit on
surrendering free exercise rights.
However, the Court has not applied this standard consistently. The aid to
parochial school cases serve as prime examples. These cases vary dramatically
and seem to turn on nearly impossible distinctions. For example, in three cases
the Court held that the state could provide benefits including vocational
help,6' sign language interpreters,6 or diagnostic speech and language
tests62 to handicapped students enrolled in religious schools. In three other
cases, the Court denied benefits for special education students including maps,
charts, tape recorders,63 or special education teachers' in parochial schools.
Similarly, in one case the Court held that the state could finance bus trans-
portation for parochial students to and from school,' while in another it held
that the state could not finance buses for field trips.'
Part of the problem in these cases is the tension between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. One view of parochial aid sees
it as a benefit conditioned on waiving religious education, much like Witters.
That creates a free exercise issue. Refusing to provide aid to religious
education penalizes those who choose it. They have to pay twice, once for
public schools they don't use, and again for parochial schools. Others view aid
to sectarian schools as a subsidy that allows religions to divert funds they
otherwise would spend on education to other religious purposes. That creates
an Establishment Clause issue. Those who view the aid as a subsidy note that
religious children have the same right to a free education as everyone else. As
a number of scholars have suggested, no principled analysis can distinguish
between penalties and subsidies,6 so there is no coherent way to decide
which conditions on religion are permissible.
The hard cases involve aid for sectarian education of disabled students.
Although the facile answer would distinguish this group from more suspect
classes by noting that they do not currently merit strict scrutiny,' they are
59. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
60. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
61. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
62. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
63. Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
64. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
65. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
66. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
67. Bandes, supra note 56; Kreimer, supra note 56; Sullivan, supra note 13.
68. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that
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doubly disadvantaged when they are excluded from services unless they forfeit
their religious options.' They are excluded because their handicap requires
expensive assistance not available to unsubsidized parochial schools. Hence,
they are excluded both on the basis of ability to pay and on the basis of
handicap.
Consider, for example, the Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet, ° where the issue was whether a community of
Orthodox Jews called the Satmar could create their own public school district
for their special education students. Satmar children were eligible to attend
special education classes in existing public school districts and some Satmar
children had attended these schools. Those children had been ostracized. Most
Satmar children attended private, religiously affiliated, sex segregated schools,
but those schools did not offer help for children with special needs.
The Court did not treat the case as one involving unconstitutional
conditions. The town of Kiryas Joel, the boundaries of which had been drawn
to include only Satmars, went to the New York legislature and negotiated for
their own school district. The issue seemed a straightforward question of
establishment. Could a religious community create and control a political
subdivision of the state, in this instance a school district, in order to avoid
being included in a more diverse school district? The question centered around
the delegation of government authority to a religious group. However, the case
could be construed as an unconstitutional conditions case. The original state
statute implicitly conditioned state funding for special education on religious
integration.
At first glance, it seems like the least powerful in this situation are the
disabled Satmar children. If they attend the public schools available to them,
they are likely to be isolated and harassed both for their disabilities and their
religious minority status. For small children, it would be difficult enough to
dress differently and have different dietary habits and rules about social
interactions, without also having to struggle with intolerance for handicaps."
Justice Stevens' response is to stress that it is the duty of the public
schools to protect students from such harassment.72 Although Justice Stevens
may be overly optimistic about the ability of the public schools to control
student ostracism, he makes an important point. His view is remarkedly
consistent with civic republican ideals that stress the duty of the polity to
inculcate public virtues like tolerance and inclusion. According to this view,
the presence of the Satmar children in public schools offers a benefit to all
children from all the relevant communities. They provide the opportunity for
practical lessons about tolerance and multi-culturalism.
disability did not trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
69. For a fuller discussion of this problem of double exclusion on the basis of being both a
disfavored class and a religious minority, see Rutherford, supra note 37; see also Martha Minow,
Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, 28 OSGOODE HALL U. 409 (1990).
70. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
71. For an excellent description of the Satmar perspective, see Martha Minow, The
Constitution and the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. U. (forthcoming Winter 1995).
72. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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In almost any context children have the least power, but they may be
protected by their parents and their communities. In contrast to the Satmar
children, their parents and the community seem much more powerful. The
community is relatively wealthy because it is largely composed of diamond
merchants and importers. 3 The community is also well-organized and
politically connected enough to get the law changed in their favor.74 The fact
that the Satmars had been able to create their own municipality is evidence of
their cooperative power and access to political clout. Other similarly situated
religious groups may have found it far more difficult to do the same.75 As a
result, the statute enabling the Satmars to create their school looks like special
interest legislation.
The question of whether to focus on the children or their parents in
religious disputes over education previously was addressed in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.76 There, the issue was whether the Amish should be required to stay
in school until the age of sixteen. The majority held that Wisconsin had to
grant a free exercise exemption to the Amish from the mandatory attendance
rule. In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the Court should focus on the
impact on the children, rather than the parents' religious preferences.77
Yoder is different from Grumet, however. In Yoder, Douglas was arguing
for including the children in a wider world than their own: "[T]he child will
be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of
diversity...78 In Grumet, those who focus on the children are arguing for
excluding them from the perspectives of the broader world.79 The Satmar
children who are educated in their own public school district are not only
segregated from other cultural, religious, and racial groups, they are also
effectively segregated from other Satmar children who do not require special
education, since virtually all the other children attend private sectarian schools.
In Yoder, the Court sustained the Amish community's right to keep itself
separate from the mainstream culture, but the separation was maintained
without government participation or financial support. In contrast, in Grumet,
the Court refused to let the Satmar community use public schools to enforce
its isolation. Thus, one of the crucial differences is that Yoder was not even
implicitly an unconstitutional conditions case. Grumet involved a state benefit
at least implicitly conditioned on integration.
Because the parents in Yoder were not receiving a state benefit, the case
more clearly involves coercion. They were forced to send their children to
73. See Minow, supra note 71.
74. The Satmar were not only able to create their own municipality and school district, they
were able to convince the New York legislature to amend the statute to try to comply with the
Supreme Court opinion in Grumet. Id.
75. Professor Kenneth Karst has suggested that some religious groups like Catholics and
Jews that previously had diminished political power have gradually acquired legislative clout,
while other groups such as the Krishnas, Seventh Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses still
must rely on courts instead of legislatures to protect their interests. Karst, supra note 41, at 353.
76. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
77. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 245.
78. Id.
79. See Minow, supra note 71.
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high school under threat of criminal prosecution. Unlike the forced integration
of Yoder, the Satmar were free to send their children either to separate
parochial schools, or integrated public schools. The Satmar parents either did
not want to pay the cost of segregated special education for their children, or
were unable to do so.
Consequently, if we measure the balance of power in terms of disad-
vantage, it is difficult to distinguish merely poor children who cannot afford
parochial school, from middle class disabled children who cannot afford such
schools if they have to pay for enabling services. One distinction is that
poverty is not an immutable characteristic. However, it is certainly beyond the
power of the children to change. Although the Court never has held that
poverty triggers strict scrutiny, it has ruled that the government cannot impose
burdens on indigents that preclude them from exercising fundamental rights.0
In ruling on the aid to parochial education, the Court rarely discusses the
fact that the refusal to fund sectarian schools most adversely affects poor and
disabled children. At least six of the Supreme Court cases concerning the
constitutionality of aid to parochial schools involve funding for special needs
students.8" The Court's analysis of these cases often focuses on the form the
benefit takes. If governmental power is delegated to a religious group, then an
establishment occurs, as in Grumet."2 If the money is given to the students or
their parents, then religion is not subsidized." If the government pays the
printer rather than the religious entity for the religious tracts, then it is not a
subsidy. 4 If, however, the state skips the families or suppliers as intermedi-
aries, then it is likely to be an illegal subsidy." Moreover, the government
80. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that the state could not
prevent indigents from marrying by imposing a burden on the right to marry); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (exempting indigents from filing fees in divorce cases where the
fee would prevent the poor from getting access to court); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (holding that states could not impose residency requirements on welfare recipients that
would burden the fundamental right of indigents to travel).
Professor Lynn Baker relies on these cases to argue that, despite the formalistic rhetoric
about penalties and subsidies, the Court only invalidates conditions imposed on those at or below
subsistence level incomes to raise the price of fundamental rights beyond their reach. Lynn A.
Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990). Unfortunately, the Court does not invalidate all such financial
burdens. For example, the Court has been willing to let impoverished women be priced out of the
market for their fundamental right to abort. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Recently, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine only seems to protect
the relatively wealthy from regulatory takings of their property. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114
S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
81. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (permitting a sign
language interpreter in a parochial school); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (holding that state funded
special education teachers in parochial schools subsidized religion); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (maps, charts, and special education teachers
supplied to parochial schools are unconstitutional subsidies); Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402
(1974).
82. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
83. See Muller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a state tax deduction for tuition at
parochial schools).
84. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
85. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that direct aid to parochial
schools violates the Establishment Clause).
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cannot condition the money on being used in secular settings." This formal
set of distinctions makes little sense. The real issue ought to turn on who is
excluded and why.
Once government decides to spend money on education, it must either
make it available to religious schools or not. It has only three choices: (1)
spend it solely on religious education; (2) spend it solely on secular public
education; or (3) spend it on both. All three choices significantly impact both
religious education and public schools. The first choice is precluded by the
Establishment Clause that prevents the government from preferring religion to
non-religion.87 The second choice seems to be permissible, but raises the cost
of religious education. The third choice remains controversial, but arguably
constitutional."8
Aid to religious schools seems to treat different religions and secular
interests equally, but it ultimately may decrease diversity in ways that are most
costly to the least powerful. If sufficient numbers of average and above
average students leave the public schools to attend religious schools that can
be more selective, only those students at greatest academic risk remain.
Because these students are more expensive to educate, they need to be
included in schools that can partially pay for their costs with the savings from
educating more easily educated students. Moreover, as the public schools
decline in quality, the pressure on secular students to select a religious school
in order to obtain a quality education mounts.
Once again, either providing a subsidy or denying it will pressure
individuals to act contrary to their religious interests. Subsidized religious
schools pressure secular students, while unsubsidized ones pressure religious
students. In both instances, the costs will be borne by those with the least
financial and academic power.
Religious persecution and governmentally established churches were the
problems of the day at the time the First Amendment was drafted. The same
problems of inclusion and exclusion now get played out in a subtler way. The
current question is not limited to direct persecution or formally established
churches, but also includes the incentives the government creates for
individuals or institutions to modify their religious beliefs or behavior.
Strict separationists might argue that the state should not have any
influence over religion at all. However, where the state allocates substantial
resources, its decision to include or exclude religion necessarily must have an
86. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
87. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating a preference
for religious publications); Toasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating a requirement
that state officials declare a belief in God as imposing religious belief on nonbelievers).
88. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980);
Mark J. Beutler, Public Funding of Sectarian Education and the Free Exercise Clause
Implications 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 7 (1993); Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A
Constitutional Analysis, 28 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 423 (1995); Peter J. Weishaar, School
Choice Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REv. 543 (1994); James B. Egle,
Comment, The Constitutional Implications of School Choice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 495.
[Vol. 72:4
A POWER-BASED THEORY
impact. A better analysis would look at the particular balance of power that
results from the imposition of the condition.
Consider, for example, Bob Jones University v. United States.' There,
the Internal Revenue Service imposed a condition that in order to receive tax
exempt status, an institution could not racially discriminate. The university
was affiliated with a -fundamentalist Christian faith that believed that African-
Americans carried the mark of Cain. As a result, the university prohibited
interracial dating. The IRS denied the university tax exempt status because it
refused to change its dating rules. The Supreme Court upheld the IRS position,
emphasizing that the government had a compelling state interest in eradicating
racial discrimination that outweighed the university's free exercise claims.
Bob Jones seems to be the classic unconstitutional conditions case. Using
the traditional analysis, the tax exemption could be considered a subsidy for
religion. If tax exemptions are viewed as subsidies, then the exemptions may
violate the Establishment Clause. In Walz v. Tax Commission,9° the Court
upheld the constitutionality of tax exemptions without considering whether the
exemption amounted to a subsidy. Instead, the Court relied on the long-
standing historical practice of tax exemptions for churches. Professor William
Nelson reads cases like Walz that privilege institutional religion as judicial
attempts to foster equality. According to Nelson, the equality sought in these
cases is defined not in terms of individual entitlement, but rather in terms of
group empowerment.9' Justice Brennan's concurrence expressly mentions a
multi-cultural purpose, noting that such exemptions "uniquely contribute to the
pluralism of American society. ' This goal of expanding diversity hints at a
power-based analysis. Those subsidies that encourage diversity help to
diminish the power of any single institution and are therefore permissible. This
view is remarkably consistent with Madison's desire to create a multitude of
sects.
If the government had denied the tax exemption in Walz, the religion
could have claimed that it was being penalized for its religious practice.
Accordingly, in Bob Jones, the question of whether the condition penalized
religion remains. The government conditioned a benefit (tax exempt status) on
following a norm inconsistent with a particular faith. That seems like a free
exercise violation. The Court could have ruled, as it later did in Smith, that the
government could create neutral rules of general applicability so long as it did
not purposely target a given religion. Although that narrows the scope of free
exercise claims dramatically, it solves the unconstitutional conditions problem
nicely. A condition is only unconstitutional if the religion can show that it was
purposely targeted for discriminatory treatment. Since that kind of proof is
difficult, most conditions would be permitted.
89. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
90. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
91. William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth Century
Constitutional Laws, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (1995).
92. Walz, 397 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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The Court did not take that tack, however. Instead, it held that the
intrusion on free exercise rights was justified because the state's interest in
eliminating racial discrimination was compelling.93 As Professor Marci
Hamilton has suggested, it is dangerous to permit the government to decide
whether religious conduct is more or less compelling than any particular state
interest.9 4 In contrast, a power-based set of norms serves the purpose of
cabining power without judging the relative merits of religious doctrine and
secular goals.
According to my thesis, whether a governmentally imposed condition is
constitutional depends on the relative power of the groups affected. The
condition in Bob Jones is justified because of the need to protect African-
Americans from subordination by other more powerful groups. Implicit is the
conclusion that fundamentalist Christians are relatively more powerful than
African-Americans in this context. That view may be supported in three ways.
First, the institutional power the university has over students supports this
assumption. Second, the history of slavery and racial discrimination makes
racial groups particularly susceptible to subordination. Third, religious groups
are by their nature more cohesive, better organized, and less diffuse than racial
groups, and hence, are able to build a nucleus of cooperative power more
easily. If the Court had ruled the other way, it would have selectively
endorsed discrimination by religious institutions. Such a ruling would not only
have given religions greater power to discriminate, it would also have
disadvantaged other disfavored groups by reinforcing subordination. Because
the condition in this context was used to diminish existing power disparities, it
is a constitutional application of the doctrine.
Unlike more recent unconstitutional condition cases where the Court has
held that conditions must be closely related to the government purpose,95 the
Court in Bob Jones seemed completely unconcerned that the condition
imposed was unrelated to the exemption being granted. Nondiscrimination is
not necessarily connected to tax exemptions, except to the extent such
exemptions are granted for diversity purposes. Consequently, the notion that
the condition must be "germane" to the purpose of the regulation or subsidy
never arose.' Although it is always risky to posit why a particular line of
analysis is missing from a case, at least three explanations are possible. First,
the Court may not have thought too much about the need for a sufficient
nexus between the conditions and the purposes served. Second, the Court may
have viewed the need for a nexus as limited to Takings Clause conditions.
There, germaneness may be an instrument to limit state power because
93. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). At least one scholar has
criticized even the compelling state interest test for free exercise claims, arguing that balancing
state interests against religious views is inappropriate. See Marci A. Hamilton, The First
Amendment's Challenge Function and the Confusion in the Supreme Court's Contemporary Free
Exercise Jurisprudence, 29 GA. L. REV. 81 (1994). In essence, Hamilton defines free exercise as
completely free from all coercion or influence. Accordingly, even the rules of the Establishment
Clause prohibiting discrimination among religions should not apply to free exercise claims.
94. See Hamilton, supra note 93.




diversity issues are less apposite. Third, germaneness may be less relevant
under the religion clauses where the preservation of diversity is a stated goal.
Applying my power-based theory of unconstitutional conditions to religion
does not make Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia97 an easy case. Rosenberger, like Bob Jones, involves conditions
imposed on government largesse (use of student activities fees). Similarly, the
decision to include or exclude religious groups affects the interests of
competing secular groups. Unlike Bob Jones, however, those groups do not
necessarily have any greater claim to protection, other than that provided by
the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, the student fees are mandatory so the
non-Christian students are coerced into supporting faiths they find repugnant.
Moreover, Rosenberger is more problematic because it involves a cash
subsidy, something the Establishment Clause has prohibited for some time. 98
Nevertheless, the fact that Rosenberger involves a cash subsidy is not a
sufficient reason to distinguish Bob Jones. At most, the difference between the
subsidy in Rosenberger and the exemption in Bob Jones is a formal one. The
actual amount of the subsidy is vastly smaller than the value of tax exempt
status for a university.
Among other reasons, subsidies are considered invidious because they
seem to "endorse" religion. However, as Justice O'Connor noted in
Rosenberger, the university attached a disclaimer reading: "Although this
organization has members who are University of Virginia students (faculty)
(employees), the organization is independent of the corporation which is the
University and which is not responsible for organization's contracts, acts, or
omissions."
A subsidy available to all offers few problems of endorsement, but
subsidies are unlikely to be equally available. Only three possibilities exist: (1)
the money will be given equally to all; (2) it will be distributed differentially;
or (3) no money will be available. Under the first scenario, the subsidy will
have diminished impact, because the amounts will be so small. In a world of
finite resources, even division often results in minuscule benefits. If the money
is selectively distributed, the amounts may be more significant but the chance
of discrimination is also greater. Even seemingly neutral rules can be
manipulated. For example, a "first come-first served" rule could be
orchestrated with inside information as to the time and place to apply. If the
information is provided equally to all, then all may apply at once, and the
matter collapses into the first option of a de minimis resource. Finally, in the
third scenario, although all groups are treated equally, no one benefits because
no funds are disbursed.
A more fundamental problem is that subsidies increase the power of
fringe groups, while simultaneously marginalizing larger, less organized
groups like secular individuals. Small cohesive groups can organize
97. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
98. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (invalidating a direct subsidy to
parochial schools).
99. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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efficiently." These groups can increase their power by block voting to
assure more benefits. In contrast, more diffuse groups are less likely to
organize, and, therefore, are less likely to vote as a block or obtain the
subsidy. Hence, a system of subsidized speech is likely to over-represent the
ideas of small cohesive groups in the marketplace of ideas. Often, religious
groups are more cohesive than larger, isolated, and more disorganized groups
of individuals defined by race, gender, disability, or secular views. Thus,
religious institutions may have more cooperative power.
This problem is exacerbated when the small groups have been given other
advantages in the marketplace of ideas. Religions, unlike other groups, are
permitted to get tax deductible contributions for lobbying. In contrast, other
groups must segregate their lobbying functions, and can only get deductions
for contributions for their charitable activities. Therefore, religions already
have greater access to the public fora than other groups.
If Rosenberger is viewed as an equal access case, it may seem difficult to
distinguish it from Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,'° and Widmar v. Vincent," which held that schools that opened
their classrooms to other, outside activities were limited public fora that could
not exclude groups based on the religious nature of their speech. Like those
cases, the amount of the public expenditures is minimal and excluding the
religious group can be construed to discriminate against a religious
viewpoint."'
Some might argue that a cash subsidy cannot be considered a forum. This
argument arises not from the fact that the benefit is a subsidy, but rather, from
the problem of equal access to a limited public forum. Defining government
benefits as fora may open all government subsidies to question. The Court is
on very shaky ground here. Once the Court acknowledges that a speaker may
need a subsidy to place her ideas in the marketplace, the very notion of an
open unregulated marketplace is subject to question." If the powerless need
subsidies to participate in the market, then arguably, the government is
constitutionally compelled to evaluate which speakers need help, and provide
the means. Such a system would pose an enormous risk of government
favoritism for particular ideas.
This problem highlights another difficulty with the Rosenberger case.
Although the Establishment Clause analysis may justify balancing power to
prevent the combined power of church and state, or to protect the free exercise
100. For an excellent discussion of these principles of political organization and the strength
that comes with small, cohesive groups, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARv. L. REv. 713, 718-28 (1985).
101. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
102. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
103. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2519-20
(1995).
104. For arguments that inequality of access vitiates the notion of a marketplace of ideas, see
CATHARINE MAcKINNON, THE WORD (1994); CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAw 155-56 (1987); Judith Baat-Ada (Reisman), Freedom of Speech as
Mythology or Quill Pen and Parchment in an Electronic Environment, 8 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 271, 275-79 (1979).
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of the religion, the free speech principles may disfavor any such balancing.
Indeed, in the context of speech, more speech is deemed to be inherently
better, regardless of the source or the impact on the balance of power. For
example, although government is admittedly the most powerful speaker, it still
has the right to speak. Similarly, fear of cohesive, well-organized groups being
over-represented should be met by more speech, not by limits on speech.
Otherwise, limits on cohesive groups undoubtedly will be directed at
disfavored political groups like Communists or Nazis.
Although the Christian group did not get its funding, it was able to
publish its magazine anyway. Thus, its views were available in the
marketplace of ideas. In this sense, this case is not much different from the
parochial school cases in which affluent parents must choose between a free
public school and a tuition-driven sectarian school. The parents can take
advantage of the free education and merely pay for religious training on the
side. Hence, they are not excluded from either their religion or from the
benefits of public education. It would be a much harder case if the religious
group had been unable to raise the money to publish their magazine. Then
they might claim not only that their right to freely exercise their faith had
been threatened by the condition, but also that the ideas were stifled.
The marketplace of ideas is supposed to determine the value of a
particular idea. The problem is that the marketplace of ideas is inefficient. Bad
ideas may be well-funded, and good ideas may be underfunded. However,
some might argue that the ability to raise money is a rough measure of the
value of an idea. If "the test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market,"' 5 then good ideas will be able to
attract funding. This view of the market assumes that the market is trying to
establish "truth."
If, instead, the market of ideas is seen as a mechanism to increase
participation, then speech is valuable because it is a form of participation that
operates in favor of inclusiveness and diversity. Under this theory, the real
issue should be who is included or excluded. That issue returns to the power-
based model of unconstitutional conditions.
In this instance, the Christian students may claim to be the less powerful
and excluded group. Whether they are less powerful is a question of fact that
depends on how power is defined. Christians may outnumber non-Christians
on campus. They already have formed an organization and identified
themselves, so they may hold more cooperative power, albeit less hierarchial
power. Nevertheless, they are the ones excluded from participation and in
some communities they are discriminated against. If the Christian group is the
least powerful, providing benefits to them on an equal basis with all others
enhances diversity and helps to balance power. Although the Court should be
skeptical about whether funds really will be disbursed equally, that risk should
not disadvantage the minority religion or its speech until an unequal division is
established. The best the Court can hope to do is focus on the more limited
105. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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question of equality among religions, although it is unclear why equal
protection of religions is entitled to any greater protection than equal
protection of other disfavored groups."°
A few caveats are in order. Even though the Christian coalition might be
less powerful in this context, in another setting it might be an advantaged
group. Hence, applying a power-based theory of unconstitutional conditions
will have to be an individualized process with a great deal of attention paid to
the facts of each case. For example, the outcome suggested for the
Rosenberger case should not start the slippery slope towards generalized aid to
parochial schools.
The disadvantage of a power-based theory of unconstitutional conditions
is that it requires detailed trials on constitutional issues. Some scholars, like
Kenneth Karst, would welcome such careful investigation into the history and
context of challenged legislation. 7 Only by carefully considering such
history and context can judges understand what is at stake for the individuals
and groups involved. The theory is less predictive than principled. The power-
based theory of unconstitutional conditions returns to the purpose of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments: assuring a balance of power that enables
individuals to participate both in the polity and their religious communities.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional law must be concerned with the power of government and
how the government is authorized to use its power. One of the central purpos-
es of the First and Fourteenth Amendments was to foster equal participation
by all citizens. Hence, constitutional conditions should be evaluated in light of
their impact on the balance of power. Because the greatest risks arise from the
largest power disparities, the more a condition entrenches or expands power
disparities, the more likely it is to be unconstitutional. Therefore, conditions
that expand diversity and participation of less empowered groups are constitu-
tional, and those that limit diversity and participation are unconstitutional.
106. See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An
Update, 75 CAL. L. REv. 5 (1987).
107. See Karst, supra note 41.
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